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Urban Poverty and Support for Islamist Terror: Survey 
Results of Muslims in Fourteen Countries 
ABSTRACT 
Survey respondents in fourteen countries representing 62% of the world’s Muslim population 
indicate that approval of Islamist terror is not associated with religiosity, lack of education, 
poverty, or income dissatisfaction. Instead, it is associated with urban poverty. These results 
are consistent with the thesis that Islamist terrorists obtain support and recruits from the urban 
poor, who pursue their economic interests off the market in politics in collective groups. 
These groups compete over state rents, so a gain for one group is a loss for another, making 
terrorism of members of out-groups rational. The rise of militant Islam can be attributed to 
high rates of urbanization in many Muslim countries in recent decades, which fosters 
violence as rising groups seek to dislodge prior groups entrenched in power. Rising group 
leaders also compete over new urban followers, so they promote fears of out-groups and 
package in-group identities in ways that ring true for the urban poor. Because many of the 
urban poor are migrants from the countryside, popular packages are those which identify with 
traditional rural values and distinguish enemies as those associated with urban modernity and 
the secular groups already in power. Imams have an incentive to preach want audiences want 
to hear, so a mutated in-group version of Islam—Islamism—struck a chord in several large 
cities around the globe at the same time. With globalization of the media, in many developing 
countries the West is widely (albeit wrongly) perceived as an inimical out-group associated 
with urban modernity. The best political strategy to limit support and recruits for Islamist 
terrorist groups is to enhance the economic opportunities available for the urban poor, and to 
provide them the needed services, such as access to health care and education, that many 
currently obtain from Islamist groups.    1
The people “may be likened to water”, offered Mao, and the guerrillas “to the fish who 
inhabit it” (Tse-Tung, 2000: 92-93). Like guerrillas, militants who employ terrorist tactics too 
can survive in the “water” of people. Terrorists and their leaders may be caught or killed, but 
as long as people provide funds, recruits, and succor, a terrorist group can exist indefinitely. 
Indeed, Islamist militant groups that use terror appear to have no trouble recruiting volunteers 
and obtaining financial support from certain communities (Sageman, 2004). This means that 
the threat of terror is a political phenomena as well as a military and criminal one, and 
understanding the political sources of terror is essential for defeating it.  
This study seeks to advance our grasp of the root sources of Islamist terror by examining 
the conditions that contribute to its approval among ordinary people. It draws on cross-
national survey data provided by the Pew Global Attitudes Project, which specifically asked 
close to 8,000 Muslims in fourteen countries their attitudes on terror in defense of Islam.
1 The 
sample represents 62% of the world’s Muslims. Several factors suggested to promote 
approval of Islamist terror are examined: religiosity, education, poverty, and income 
dissatisfaction. The analyses indicate support for only one factor: urban—but not rural—
poverty.  
The role of urban poverty is consistent with the thesis that Islamist terror is rooted in the 
highly insecure conditions of the larger cities of the developing world (Mousseau, 2002-03). 
As migrants escaping rural poverty arrive in the cities in hopes of making a living, many 
cannot find jobs on the market and are forced to pledge loyalty to group leaders who pursue 
their interests off the market in politics with threats and acts of violence. Because a gain for 
one group means a loss for another, there are not common but inimical interests among 
                                                 
1 The Pew Global Attitudes Project bears no responsibility for the interpretations presented or 
conclusions reached herein based on analysis of the data. The Pew data can be obtained at 
http://pewglobal.org.   2
groups competing over state rents. In this inter-group zero-sum-like environment, terrorizing 
members of out-groups is a cost-effective strategy. Group leaders compete for followers, so 
they promote fears of out-groups and package in-group identities in ways that ring true with 
the everyday circumstances of the urban poor. Unaccustomed to the impersonal cities, 
popular packages are those which identify with a traditional rural set of norms and values, 
and set apart as enemies those associated with cold urban life. With globalization of media, 
the West, led by the United States, has emerged as a popular enemy out-group associated 
with modernity and thus widely perceived as having opposing interests.  
The policy implication is profound: to clear Islamist terrorists from the “water” of people 
from which they obtain succor and recruits, states and international organizations must 
expand economic opportunities in the large cities of the Islamic world, and provide the 
needed services, such as access to health care and education, which many currently obtain by 
pledging loyalty to militant Islamist groups. This conclusion closely matches studies of 
terrorist incidents, which have shown that state welfare spending reduces the likelihood that a 
nation produces transnational terrorism perpetrated by its citizens (Burgoon, 2006). 
This article is organized as follows. I begin below with an assessment of the several 
individual-level explanations for Islamist terror found in the literature. Next, I review how 
urban poverty can cause support for terror. I then present the Pew data and survey results, and 
conclude with the implications: the threat of Islamist terror makes urban poverty a global 
security issue. 
  
ASSESSING EXPLANATIONS FOR ISLAMIST TERROR 
 
The study of the popular roots of Islamist terror combines at least two broad literatures, 
neither of which can be fully covered here: The study of terror as a tactical form of violence,   3
on the one hand, and the specific conflict that pits Islamist militants, who advocate Salifism 
and Jihad, against the comparatively secular governments of many countries. ‘Salifism’ is an 
altered form of Islam conceived as purified from Western or modern influences; ‘Jihad’ as 
used by Islamists usually means war against non-believers, who can be Muslims who do not 
accept Salifi beliefs.
2 Global Salifis perceive the US and the West as their far enemy. The 
quarrel is thus a series of low intensity armed conflicts within some nations with Muslim 
populations. It became internationalized when some Islamists began attacking the US and its 
Western allies using terrorist tactics. ‘Militant Islam’ or ‘Islamism’ should never be confused 
with traditional or conventional Islam. 
  Since the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001, several 
explanations for Islamist terror have grown popular in the Western media. I suggest that to 
properly assess these explanations it is useful to compare them on how well they can account 
for four salient features of Islamist terror: 1) that individuals feel morally justified in waging 
terrorist violence, which by definition means acts of violence against civilian targets; 2) that 
individuals are volunteering to abet and engage in terrorist violence, putting themselves at 
grave risk; 3) that Islamism and Islamist terror are relatively recent phenomena; and 4) that 
Islamists identify the West, led by the US, as an enemy. 
First, a good explanation for terror should explicate the processes that can cause a person 
to approve acts of terror. Most readers of this article know that they, and probably everyone 
they know, would never approve the murder of a child even if the expected utility of doing so 
outweighed its cost. It is not enough to attribute approval of mass murder to psychological 
deviation or vague assertions of desperation: Research has established that known terrorists 
are not more likely than others to suffer from mental disorders (Sageman, 2004: 81; 
                                                 
2 I thank Ibrahim al-Marashi for making these points clear to me.   4
Victoroff, 2005). It would thus seem unlikely that those who merely approve of terror, rather 
than engage in it, tend to suffer from mental disorders. 
Second, a good explanation for Islamist terror should account for how an individual can 
move from approving terror to actively supporting it or engaging in it. Decisions to help a 
terrorist group with funds, to hide terrorists, or to engage in terror impose great costs, as they 
put an individual at grave risk of capture by authorities and subsequent torture and possible 
death. This poses a quandary for rational choice theories of social science: One may agree 
with a terror group’s goals, but a rational and self-interested individual should seek to free 
ride and let others carry the burden (Olson, 1971[1965]).
3  
Third, a convincing account of Islamist terror must explain its variance across time. The 
Islamist movement that is associated with approval of Islamist terror is mostly a 
contemporary phenomenon. It is true that Muslim-related terror can be traced back to the 
twelfth century, when assassins were employed by a local caliph to spread terror in the form 
of murder and destruction among religious enemies, including women and children (Combs, 
2003: 20). But by this standard many religions have terror in their history, such as the 
Christian terror of the Spanish Inquisition. In comparative terms, most Muslim history, like 
most Christian history, is characterized with peace and a degree of tolerance of non-believers.  
In fact, just two generations ago politically-active Muslims in the Middle-East were far 
more likely to identify with secular and nationalist movements than religious ones. Examples 
include the explicitly modernist and secular leadership of Abdul Nasser of Egypt, and the 
Baath Parties of Iraq and Syria. Terror as a tactic by non-state groups was limited in scope 
and confined mostly to acts of the explicitly secular Palestinian Liberation Organization in its 
                                                 
3 Of course, we could solve this quandary with the simple assumption that the primary goal of the 
terrorist is to die and reach heaven. This solution would be trivial, however, because it does not 
inform us why some individuals develop the primary goal of heaven and some do not.    5
peculiar state-issue conflict with Israel. Suicide terror in the name of jihad was rare, if it 
occurred at all. The Muslim Brotherhood, a religious movement, has long been a presence in 
some countries, but Islamism as it is known today is largely a product of the 1980s and 
1990s. A complete theory of Islamist terror must account not only for its presence today, but 
its absence a generation ago.  
Finally, a good explanation for Islamist terror should account for why the United States 
and other countries of the West are enemies. Explanations that put the blame on US foreign 
policy are not satisfying, for two reasons. First, as evident from the Islamist terror attacks on 
Australians (in Indonesia) and indiscriminant attacks in France, Spain and the United 
Kingdom, Islamists consider the entire West the enemy, not only the US. Second, we know 
that at least some of the wrath against the West is not rooted in reality: Popular discourse in 
the Muslim Middle East regarding the West is usually based on rumors that, true or not, 
coexist with countless other rumors and conspiracy theories. Anti-American rumors are 
simply more believed and likely to spread than neutral or pro-American kinds of rumors 
(Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2004). Countless examples are available in the regional media, a 
classic case being the belief, seemingly widely shared even among many educated people in 
the Arab Middle-East, that 4,000 Jews were warned not to go to work at the World Trade 
Center on 11 September 2001 (Friedman, 2002). The tendency to believe anti-American 
rumors (and reject pro-American ones) is the consequence of something other than actual US 
foreign policy, and is thus one of the features of Islamist terror that must be explained. 
Below I offer an assessment of how well several explanations for Islamist terror often 
mentioned in the popular and academic literature can account for its four salient features: the 
moral-justification question, the free-rider paradox, variance over time and space, and the 
identification of the US and the West as enemies. Survey analyses can test only individual-
level explanations, so state-level explanations—such as weak state institutions or political   6
oppression—are beyond the scope of this study. In addition, most of the individual-level 
explanations for terror discussed herein—religiosity, education, poverty, and income 
dissatisfaction—have long traditions in the conflict literature and there is no need to dwell on 
them at length here. The exception is the newer theory of market civilization, which identifies 
the roots of terror in urban poverty in nations with weak markets. This theory is discussed in 
greater depth in the subsequent section.  
 
Islam. Salafi jihadism is a religious revival movement, and Islamist terrorists justify their 
acts in the name of Islam. This suggests for some that Islamic doctrine and culture may be a 
root cause of the terror (e.g., Horan, 2002). Intensity of belief—such as the reward of 
paradise with martyrdom—can easily account for the moral justification question and the 
free-rider paradox. I believe the thesis has a major weakness, however: across time Muslim 
religion is essentially a constant while Islamist terror is a variable. A constant cannot explain 
a variable. While prevailing Islamic doctrines and interpretations can and have changed over 
time, these changes are relatively rare and are largely constrained by the Koran, which in 
Islam is understood as the literal work of God. To my knowledge, no one has identified any 
specific and recent doctrinal changes by non-Salifi leaders of Islam that can be linked with 
approval of Islamist terror or rage with the West.  
 
Education. Lack of education as a source of terror is common in the popular literature, but 
few have actually explained how education might reduce support for it (Krueger & 
Maleckova, 2003: B10). Perhaps this is because people can be educated in many ways, and 
individuals can be educated to support terror (Perlez, 2003). There are two additional 
problems with the education hypothesis. First, education levels in most countries today are 
higher than they were a generation ago. Since Islamist terror is a recent phenomena, lack of   7
education would seem to offer an unlikely explanation for it. Second, those known to have 
become terrorists tend to have high levels of education (Krueger & Maleckova, 2002; 
Sageman, 2004: 75; Krueger, 2007). While some terrorists and their leaders are not well 
educated, many are engineers and medical doctors, such as al-Qaeda leaders Osama Bin 
Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri. Of course, it is possible that these patterns may be explained 
by terrorist leaders screening for high quality recruits (Bueno de Mesquita, 2005). The tests 
below, which examine approval of Islamist terror among ordinary citizens, offer a test of this 
possibility.   
 
Poverty. While popular intuition suggests that poverty can cause terror, to my knowledge no 
thought-through argument exists for how this can happen. Usually the linkage is indirect, 
with poverty causing other factors that may cause support for terror, such as economic 
inequality or low levels of education (Crenshaw, 1990; Burgoon, 2006: 180). Many such 
claims are usually about the decision to become a terrorist, and even here they offer little 
more than vague references to resentment and desperation (eg., Newman, 2006: 751). For 
instance, Klaus Topfer, Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme, 
has argued that poverty (and environmental degradation) can “fan the flames of hate and 
ignite a belief that terrorism is the only solution to a community’s or nation’s ills . . . 
desperate people can resort to desperate solutions” (quoted in Newman, 2006: 752). 
While desperation would seem to account for the moral justification question and free-
rider paradox, this thesis suffers from several internal validity problems. First, to my 
knowledge, no one has shown how poverty can cause desperation, which is non-rational 
behavior. Second, there is a marginal utility problem: the less money one has, the more each 
unit of it is worth. So an individual with few possessions should value them no less than a 
wealthy individual with more possessions. Vague assumptions that poorer individuals do not   8
value their own lives or their meager possessions, and loved ones, do not seem completely 
thought through.  
The thesis also suffers from two serious external validity problems. First, poverty is all 
over the world, particularly as we go back in time, yet international terror is a relatively rare 
and recent phenomenon. Second, poverty is not correlated with terrorist incidences (Piazza, 
2006) or the decision to become a terrorist (Krueger & Maleckova, 2002). While poverty may 
be linked with terror in some way, it seems unlikely that poverty is a direct cause of it. 
 
Income Dissatisfaction. One way poverty may be linked with terror is through income 
dissatisfaction. According to relative deprivation theory, the risk of political violence 
increases when there is discrepancy between what a person feels ought to be and what is. As 
applied to international terror, poverty relative to foreigners might fuel feelings of inferiority 
and rage (Gurr, 2006: 86-87). Still, many scholars have examined the relationship between 
inequality and violence and the evidence is consistently mixed (Piazza, 2006; Lichbach, 
1989: 431–470). Moreover, if international inequality is a source of terror, then it would be 
the poorest countries, such as those in Africa, that produce most of it; not the relatively 
wealthy societies of the Middle East (Tanrioven, 2009: 57-58). In other respects, however, 
income dissatisfaction seems to offer a plausible explanation for approval of Islamist terror: it 
may account for its variance over time and space; for why global Salifi jihadists consider the 
West an enemy; and a rage of inequality could conceivably cause one to feel justified in 
approving mass murder. More seems needed, however, to account for the free-rider paradox 
in the decision to aid, abet, or engage in terror.  
   9
MARKET CIVILIZATION AND ITS CLASH WITH TERROR  
 
While most of the above explanations have long traditions in the literature, my own more 
recent research suggests that Islamist terror may be rooted in a clash of economic 
civilizations (Mousseau, 2002-03). In the advanced economies most citizens normally obtain 
their incomes, goods, and services dealing with strangers in the marketplace; in nations with 
weak markets citizens are far more likely to depend on the goodwill of others in their families 
and various kinds of groups (Polanyi, [1944] 1957). Individuals dependent on a market have 
a direct economic interest in the welfare and freedom of others because there are more 
opportunities from strangers who are wealthy and free to contract compared with strangers 
who are less wealthy and less free. There is also interest in the equal protection of strangers, 
since only citizens who can rely on their states in enforcing contracts impartially can 
rigorously engage the market. Since there is no apparent reason to limit these interests in the 
welfare, freedom, and equal rights of strangers to one’s own nation, religion, or ethnicity, I 
have suggested that there is a global “market civilization” (Mousseau, 2002-03).  
Within market civilization civil and interstate wars do not happen because war requires 
the harming of others, and most citizens in market-intensive economies are always better off 
when others in the market are richer, not poorer. Instead, citizens have direct interests in their 
states promoting economic growth, at home and abroad, and thus cooperating with other 
states for the greater good. In addition, to preserve and enhance opportunities in the global 
marketplace, citizens have an interest in preserving the primacy of states as enforcers of 
domestic and international law and in opposing all threats to the Westphalian interstate 
system. In fact, there has never been a single fatality in any conflict between nations with 
market-intensive economies (Mousseau, 2009), and these nations tend to agree on global 
issues (Mousseau, 2003) and ally together in conflicts with others (Mousseau, 2002).   10
Outside of market civilization, in contrast, the dearth of opportunities in the marketplace 
causes many citizens to form into groups which pursue state rents off the market in politics. 
These groups are organized on the principle of reciprocity (Mauss, 2000 [1924]): group 
leaders obtain state rents for followers with implicit or explicit threats of violence against the 
state and other groups, and followers respond with loyalty to group leaders rather than their 
states (Roniger, 1994). Because a state privilege for one group is a loss for another, political 
parties and ethnic groups are in a constant state of conflict over distributive gains. This means 
whichever coalition is in power must privilege its supporters and repress others, and the state 
has little incentive to provide public goods—including law and order. It also means that civil 
war over control of the state and terror of others over the distribution of state rents is rational 
(Mousseau, 2002-03). 
How can a clash of economic civilizations account for the four salient features of 
Islamist terror? Shedding light on the moral justification question is the concept of bounded 
rationality: that humans economize on the costs of decision making by forming decision 
making habits, or heuristics, for situations that arise routinely (Simon, 1955). While in market 
civilization the habit is to value the freedom and rights of strangers (because doing so brings 
economic benefits in the longer term), for individuals dependent on groups that compete over 
state rents the habit is to abide by orders of superiors and discriminate strangers according to 
group membership (because doing so brings economic benefits in the longer term). While 
many individuals in all societies can sometimes overcome their everyday heuristics, with 
bounded rationality we can see how the norm of group loyalty and fear of members of out-
groups can lower the threshold for approving acts of terror against members of out-groups, 
especially when ordered by group leaders, compared with individuals in market civilization, 
who routinely value loyalty to the state and equal rights, and thus customarily perceive acts of 
terror as highly egregious violations of victims’ rights.   11
Nor is there a collective action problem in the resort to civil violence in nations with 
weak markets. Individuals are loyal to their groups rather than their states, and there is no 
collection action problem for group leaders since they can directly benefit from a fight while 
bearing few of its burdens (Olson, 1971[1965]). Just as citizens in market civilization are 
routinely loyal to their states and fear the sanctions of resisting state authorities, in nations 
with weak markets citizens are routinely loyal to their groups and fear the sanctions of 
resisting group authorities. Just as many in market civilization habitually abide by state orders 
to fight, kill, and be killed for their states, many in nations with weak markets habitually 
abide by group orders to fight, kill, and be killed for their groups. Indeed, we know that 
suicide terror is at least partly motivated by in-group affinity (Sageman, 2004: 135), just as 
dying in battle for the state in market civilization is partly motivated by in-group affinity 
(Stouffer, 1949). This willingness to fight for their groups in nations with weak markets 
includes those aligned with the state (and thus engaging in repression of out-groups) as well 
as those challenging it (and thus engaging in anti-state violence). In fact, we know that 
nations with weak markets tend to have high levels of state repression (Mousseau & 
Mousseau, 2008). 
In these ways, the economic condition of weak markets, by forcing individuals into 
groups, may be a necessary condition for civil war, sectarian violence, and the indigenous 
production of sustained and organized terrorism. But weak markets are not a sufficient 
condition for inter-group and anti-state violence because ruling group coalitions based on 
patron-clientelist ties can sometimes manage stability with various combinations of severe 
repression and economic re-distribution. Instead, violence in nations with weak markets is 
associated with change: when older groups entrenched in power become weaker and newer 
groups become stronger. When this happens, newer groups must often demonstrate their 
rising power with violence.   12
Political changes can include foreign invasions, such as the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1979 and the toppling of Saddam Hussein in 2003, both of which precipitated 
extreme levels of inter-group violence and terror. Demographic changes can include high 
rates of urbanization, as countless rural families in many countries have migrated to the cities 
in recent years (United Nations, 2006). This has been a particular challenge for the Muslim 
world (Kepel, 2002: 1-2): since 1970 the average annual increase in urban population in the 
predominantly-Muslim countries was 5.4% compared with only 3.4% for all other countries. 
This difference is statistically significant (p < 0.0001).
4 
In nations with weak markets, anyone not in a group and not surviving in the market is in 
a highly insecure condition. Since migrants from the countryside to the cities effectively exit 
their rural groups, and there are limited employment opportunities in the urban job markets, 
many are usually forced to seek security in new groups, often starting with family ties 
(Hossain, 2005: 6-7). In exchange for loyalty, new urban group leaders often provide help in 
housing, paying children’s school fees, access to health care, employment, and so on, and for 
poorer neighborhoods they are sometimes crucial for securing access to city sewage lines and 
electric power grids. Usually these groups manage to provide these services through various 
militant, criminal, and political activities. Larger groups with more followers are more 
capable than smaller ones, so smaller groups pledge loyalty to larger groups, and larger group 
leaders often compete for followers. In this way, larger group leaders must be understood as 
political entrepreneurs: they have an incentive to “market” their groups by setting group 
boundaries and identifying out-group enemies in ways that ring true for potential clients. 
                                                 
4 Predominantly-Muslim countries are those with greater than 50% Muslim population. The difference 
of Muslim and other nations is also significant when nations in market civilization are excluded from 
the sample: 5.5% and 4.1%. A list of nations with market-intensive economies can be viewed at 
http://home.ku.edu.tr/~mmousseau/economic norms data.   13
In the cities of the developing world, political entrepreneurs seeking clients from the 
urban poor often find success in advocating anti-modern values, for at least two reasons. 
First, migrants from the countryside are usually accustomed to depending on friends and 
families and are unused to the urban environment where they regularly encounter strangers 
who look and dress differently and seem to act selfishly. So successful groups have learned to 
package their group identities as representative of traditional and rural norms and values, and 
identify out-groups as those associated with modern urban life. Second, the primary 
opposition to the urban poor and their quest for state rents often comes from ruling groups 
already entrenched in power. In many countries these groups are the traditional urban elite 
who have long adopted Western or “modern” costumes and life styles. For rising political 
entrepreneurs intent on challenging the entrenched power of the privileged “modern” groups, 
taking an anti-modern stance makes strategic sense. 
In many countries with Muslim populations and high rates of urbanization, the Islamist 
identity emerged for at least two reasons. First, in many countries the traditional urban elite 
who are the main opposition to the rural poor had previously adopted various nationalist, 
socialist and secular ideologies and images. Since these symbols and images were already 
embraced by their opponents, political entrepreneurs representing the urban poor needed 
something new. Second, the democratic nature of Sunni Islam means that imams, like group 
leaders, compete for followers. The increasing numbers of migrants arriving from the 
countryside created an incentive for many urban imams to preach what many of the urban 
poor wanted to hear, which often means some religious justification for their fears of 
“modern” out-groups. Imams naturally promote not a tribal, nationalist or some sort of 
secular identity but a religious one. In these ways, a mutated in-group version of Islam—
Islamism—could strike a chord in several large cities around the globe at the same time, and 
some urban imams emerged as leaders of new groups offering protection for the urban poor.   14
Migrants from the countryside go not only to Cairo and Islamabad, but to Paris and London, 
so Islamism took root among Muslim immigrants in the large cities of the West as well as the 
East. 
Evidence for this chain of causation from area studies is overwhelming. Most analysts 
agree that in-group loyalty and patron-client corruption have long infected every country of 
the Muslim Middle East (Hamzeh, 2001), and that citizens outside of ruling groups have 
traditionally faced discrimination: “If you were not the nephew of a general or a member of 
the royal family it was very difficult for you even to have access to credit, to import anything 
or become an entrepreneur” (Kepel, 2002: 2). We also know that in recent decades in many 
Muslim countries a wide network of charities has gained an ample following among the 
urban poor (ibid.). The most popular have been Islamist ones, which often serve as 
“employment agencies, food banks and charities, schools and nurseries, savings clubs and 
financial institutions, student and professional associations, and even sports clubs and cultural 
gatherings” (Sadowski, 2006: 226). They attract support from people “who may not be 
particularly pious . . . but who simply need the services that the movements provide” (ibid.: 
227). They also demand blind obedience from their followers (Gunaratna, 2002: 87; Kepel, 
2002: 6; Sadowski, 2006: 232-33). In fact, most known terrorists became religious after 
joining their new groups (Sageman, 2004: 97, 117). We also know that at the heart of the 
Islamist movement is a rejection of modern values (Majid, 2000) and associated “greed and 
crass materialism” (Sadowski, 2006: 233), and that urbanization and internal migrations have 
long been correlated with terrorist activity (Ross, 1993: 321; Massey, 1996; Brennan-Galvin, 
2002; Stern, 2003: 63–106; Sageman, 2004: 147).  
It is globalization that caused the West, led by the US, to emerge as the far enemy of the 
Islamist movement. In many countries ruling groups in opposition to the urban poor long ago 
adopted Western costumes and life styles, and with globalization of media millions of urban   15
poor regularly witness the Western way of life on their television screens (Adelkhah, 2000; 
Verkaaik, 2004). For an impoverished Muslim in Cairo, Islamabad, or Jakarta, when an imam 
preaches that the crass materialism of urban life is a Westernization of their societies, or the 
result of a Western conspiracy to destroy Islam (meaning them), for many the message rings 
true. These claims are buttressed by the US alliance with Israel and US and Western military 
interventions in the Gulf Wars, Somalia and Kosovo. While some of these interventions were 
clearly motivated at saving (Muslim) lives, from the in-group perspective of zero-sum 
competition over state rents there is no such thing as universal gains: these interventions 
could only be for US or Western interests which must be inimical to their own.
5  
In these ways, al-Qaeda’s attack on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 
made strategic sense: It created a highly visible image that bolstered the claims of Islamists 
that there is indeed a conflict between the West and Islam.
6 The al-Qaeda group knew that for 
many Muslims the Western responses against Islamist terror would look like Western attacks 
on Islam, thereby increasing the popularity and thus influence of Islamist groups. Nor can 
their more-secular opponents in power help tame anti-Westernism and anti-Americanism: 
like all political entrepreneurs in nations with weak markets, governing elites have an 
incentive to promote themselves as effective protectors of the “national” in-group by 
propping up fears of foreigners, and often the US and the West are their most convenient 
scapegoats. 
                                                 
5 Of course, angst at the US for its alliance with Israel by non-Arab Muslims is most likely a 
consequence, rather than a cause, of rising pan-Islamic identity. 
6 Anecdote: When asked for evidence for the claim, popular in the Muslim world, that people in the 
West are anti-Muslim, my predominantly-Muslim Turkish students invariably cite the Islamist attack 
on the West of 11 September 2001.   16
The market-civilization thesis is primarily sociological: it predicts values, preferences, 
and interests from society-level, not individual-level, economic conditions. But there are still 
individual level implications that might be observable: among Muslim populations in nations 
with weak markets and high levels or urbanization, approval of Islamist terror should be 
highest among those in rising groups challenging the status quo—the urban poor. Urban 
dwellers who are not poor, in contrast, are likely to be either in the market or dependent on 
groups allied in power. They are thus likely to be threatened by Islamist terror and oppose it. 
Rural dwellers who are poor, on the other hand, are likely to be ensconced in more traditional 
groups that have long been allied with the ruling coalition groups in power—even if this 
alliance accrues little in state rents—and thus not likely to identify with Islamist groups. The 
test hypothesis is thus: 
 
Hypothesis: Neither poverty or urban status is associated with approval of Islamist 
terror, but individuals who are both poor and urban are more likely than others to approve 
it. 
 
SURVEYING THE MUSLIM WORLD 
 
One of the most important quests for political analysts today is in identifying the individual 
level conditions associated with approval of Islamist terror. Unfortunately, surveys in 
developing countries can be very difficult and expensive: Poor record keeping complicates 
the construction of representative samples; poor road and communications infrastructure 
makes locating respondents difficult and costly. In addition, response rates for sensitive 
questions can be very low, and politically-sensitive questions may be unwise or even 
prohibited. One of the most complete cross-national surveys that have examined attitudes in   17
the developing world is offered by the Pew Global Attitudes surveys. To my knowledge these 
surveys are the only large cross-national ones that ask about approval of Islamist terror in 
multiple countries with Muslim populations. For these reasons the merits of the Pew 
Surveys—its extensive coverage and its query on approval of terror in defense of Islam—far 
outweighs any weaknesses associated with the difficulties of surveying populations in low 
income countries.   
  I draw on Pew data for 2002, so attitudes are less affected by the Gulf War that began in 
2003. There are fourteen nations in the survey where respondents identifying themselves as 
Muslim were asked whether they approved of terror in defense of Islam. These respondents 
represent roughly 62% of the world’s 1.5 billion Muslims.
7 Question 55 asked:  
 
Some people think that suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian 
targets are justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies. Other people believe that, 
no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is never justified. Do you personally feel 
that this kind of violence is often justified to defend Islam, sometimes justified, rarely 
justified, or never justified?’  
 
Almost half of all Muslims surveyed—49%—believe that terror in defense of Islam can 
“never” be justified. A smaller number of respondents say such terror is “rarely” (15%), 
“sometimes” (21%), or “often” justified (15%). Since respondents who believe that Islamist 
terror is “often” justified are not twice as pro-terror as respondents who believe that it is 
“rarely” justified, the variable does not meet the interval level of measurement necessary for 
                                                 
7 The fourteen countries where Muslim respondents were asked the question on Islamist terror are: 
Bangladesh, Ghana, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Lebanon, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, 
Tanzania, Turkey, Uganda, and Uzbekistan.   18
linear regression. I thus estimate the measure with an ordered logistic function using 
maximum likelihood. I considered ‘don’t know’ and ‘refused’ answers in the surveys as 
missing values, yielding a response rate of 61%, which is high enough to draw reasonably 
confident generalizations (Babbie, 1992: 267). I call the variable Approval of Islamist Terror, 
since the question is framed in the context of the suicide bombing and other forms of terror 
that have been predominantly, if not entirely, carried out by Islamist groups in recent years. 
Additional questions in the Pew Survey allow us to examine the several individual-level 
factors posited as influencing approval of Islamist terror. From the discussion above, we 
should seek to gauge respondents’ religious practices, level of education, feeling of income 
dissatisfaction, level of poverty, and urban poverty. Because most of the questions ask about 
clear behavioral conditions (such as whether or not they have electricity in their homes), I 
anticipate minimal risk of systematic bias from language and cultural differences among the 
fourteen countries in the sample. All of the variables correlate safely, most at less than 0.20 
(Pearson’s r); the exceptions are, not surprisingly, Poverty with Education (-0.34) and 
Income Dissatisfaction (0.32). The response rate was 99% for those who answered the 
question on terror. While details of variable constructions are discussed below, their summary 
statistics and correlations can be viewed in the Appendix. 
  The aim of the analyses is to test for individual-level patterns in approval of Islamist 
terror in the Muslim world after consideration of country differences. Accordingly, the data 
are pooled and all the estimates control for country differences with the inclusion of country 
dummy variables (Ghana is included in the intercept). As a further precaution against 
clustering by country, I report only estimates with robust, panel-corrected standard errors. All 
the analyses include as well adjustments for the weight variable provided in the Pew dataset,   19




Islamic Practices. We can never know what anyone is thinking, but it seems reasonable that 
individuals who practice traditional religious customs are more likely than others to be 
influenced by its doctrines. Question 80 asked respondents identifying themselves as 
Muslims: “How often, if at all, do you pray: hardly ever, only during religious holidays, only 
on Fridays, only on Fridays and religious holidays, more than once a week, every day at least 
once, or every day five times?” 
  As can be seen in Model 1, the coefficient for Islamic Practice (0.00) is zero and about as 
insignificant as a variable can get (p = 0.944). To be sure that these results are not an artifact 
of the linear assumption of the measure, I retested for non-linear functional forms—estimates 
using the natural log or square of the measure (unreported). These too failed to yield 
significant results. It seems that Muslims who abide by traditional Islamic practices are not 
more likely to approve of Islamist terror than other Muslims. While it is impossible to get 
into the heads of anyone, the state of evidence is that Islam itself is not a likely cause of 
approval of Islamist terror. 
 
[Table I about here] 
 
                                                 
8 Specifically, each regression was weighted by a sample-specific weight variable using Stata’s 
(version 10) “pwight” command. For each regression, this weight was calculated as the product of the 
Pew weight variable and the inverse of the probability that the observation is included due to sample 
size. Additional regressions (unreported) with only the Pew weight variable produce identical results.    20
Education. The Pew Surveys make a distinction of technical from university-preparation 
type of secondary education (Question 84: “What is the highest level of education that you 
have completed?”). As a result, the nine possible levels of education for most countries are 
not necessarily in a progressive order suitable for regression analysis. For instance, we cannot 
be sure that the category ‘Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type’ is less 
education than ‘Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type.’ To have confidence that 
higher levels of this category always mean higher levels of education, I collapsed the 
categories that make the distinction of technical from university-preparatory education, 
realizing a seven-point scale.
9  
  As can be seen in Model 2, the coefficient for Education (0.02) is not significant (p = 
0.652). Further tests for non-linear functional forms (unreported) failed to produce significant 
results. It seems that approval of terror is not a likely function of low levels of education. 
This is consistent with what we know about known terrorists (Krueger & Maleckova, 2002; 
Sageman, 2004: 75; Krueger, 2007). Since those who approve of Islamist terror do not have 
lower levels of education than those who do not approve of it, it seems that if terrorist leaders 
are screening for high quality recruits as some suggest (Bueno de Mesquita, 2005), they are 
not screening from a below average pool.  
 
Poverty. Two questions in the Pew survey ask respondents concrete behavioral conditions 
that indicate their level of poverty. Question 87 asks if there had been times during the prior 
year when the respondent’s family did not have enough money to: a) buy needed food (40% 
of respondents); b) pay for needed medical and health care (44%); or c) buy needed clothing 
(40%). Question 89 asks if respondent’s household has a) electricity (90%); b) a working TV 
                                                 
9 In three of the fourteen countries—Ghana, Nigeria, and Pakistan—I had to reset the categories to 
realize the seven-point scale.     21
(81%); c) running water in the house (67%); d) a flush toilet (49%); and e) a car (19%). Of 
these, possession of a TV (89b) and car (89e) seem qualitatively distinct in that neither is 
necessary for a healthy life, and some individuals go without these possessions by choice. I 
thus summed all the positive responses of Question 87 and negative responses of Question 89 
with the exception of categories b (TV) and e (car).  
  As can be seen in Model 3, the coefficient for Poverty (-0.03) is insignificant (p = 0.526). 
Tests for the natural log or square of the measure (unreported) failed to improve the results in 
any way. It appears that individuals in poverty are not more likely than others to approve of 
terror. 
 
Income Dissatisfaction. Question 6a asks: “Please tell me whether you are very satisfied, 
somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with your household income.” 
As can be seen in Model 4, the coefficient for Income Dissatisfaction (-0.12) is significant 
but negative, indicating the counter-intuitive result that the more dissatisfied a person is with 
their income, the less likely they are to approve of terror. Tests for functional form 
(unreported) show the log of this measure to be the most robust, indicating that approval of 
terror is most closely associated with the first category of being very satisfied with one’s 
income. Since those who are very satisfied with their income are more likely than others to 
approve of Islamist terror, it seems highly unlikely that the global Salafi jihad is rooted in any 
kind of dispute over global inequality. 
 
Urban Poverty. The final hypothesis is that urban poverty, but not urbanity or poverty per 
se, is associated with approval of terror. To gauge rural poverty I interacted Poverty with the 
dummy measure Urban (Question 97), which has the value of 1 for respondents living in 
places with populations greater than 500,000 (a definition that includes 25% of the sample).   22
Since Urban is a binary variable, the interaction term Urban*Poverty indicates the impact of 
poverty for urban dwellers; the constituent term Poverty indicates the impact of poverty for 
rural dwellers; and the constituent term Urban indicates the impact of urban status for 
respondents at 0 levels of poverty—that is, those who in the prior year never went without 
needed food, money for needed medical care, or clothing, and have in their home electricity, 
running water, and a flush toilet—or 34% of urban dwellers (Friedrich, 1982).  
As can be seen in Model 5, the interaction term Urban*Poverty (0.15) is positive and 
significant (p < 0.001), indicating that poverty promotes approval of terror for urban dwellers. 
This is consistent with the expectation that approval of terror is rooted in the dislocations of 
urban poverty, where many lack economic security and form loyalties to group leaders who 
pursue state rents with threats and uses of force, shored up with ideological and identity 
claims. The constituent term for Poverty (-0.05) is negative and actually significant at the 
lower 0.10 threshold (p = 0.064). This indicates that poverty in rural areas decreases the 
probability a person approves of terror. This is not a surprise: rural dwellers are likely to be 
ensconced in traditional in-groups that are challenged by the new Islamist groups. 
An alternative explanation for these results could be that terrorist outreach efforts may 
occur mainly in cities, and the proportion of poor people may be higher in cities. But this 
alternative cannot be correct because poverty is higher in rural areas (2.7) than urban ones 
(1.8)—this is why rural folks migrate to the cities. In addition, the coefficient for Urban (-
0.17) is in the negative direction (and insignificant), indicating that urbanity among the non-
poor, if it has any effect, reduces approval of terror. Still, to be sure that Urban is 
insignificant across the full range of Poverty, I re-tested Model 5 with the interaction term 
removed. Both constituent terms are insignificant in this additive model (unreported), 
confirming that the impact of each is conditional on the presence of the other.
10  
                                                 
10 The coefficients with standard errors in parentheses are: Poverty 0 .01 (0.03) and Urban 0.16 (0.19).     23
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Terrorists and their leaders may be caught or killed, but as long as community yields funds, 
political support, and recruits, a terrorist group can exist indefinitely. This means terror is a 
political problem as well as a criminal one, and to construct an effective political strategy for 
combating it we must understand its root causes. Analyses of roughly 8,000 survey 
respondents representing 62% of the world’s 1.5 billion Muslims indicates that approval of 
terror in defense of Islam is not a likely function of Muslim faith, poor education, poverty, or 
income dissatisfaction. Instead, approval of Islamist terror is linked with urban—but not 
rural—poverty.  
  The role of urban poverty is consistent with the ‘market civilization’ thesis that Islamist 
terror is rooted in the highly insecure conditions of the larger cities of the developing world 
(Mousseau, 2002-03). In these cities many cannot find jobs on the market and are forced to 
pledge loyalty to group leaders who pursue their interests off the market in politics with 
threats and acts of violence. Groups compete over state rents, so a gain for one group means a 
loss for another, making terrorism of members of out-groups a cost-effective strategy. Group 
leaders also compete for followers, so they promote fears of out-groups and package in-group 
identities in ways that ring true with the everyday circumstances of the urban poor. Appealing 
packages are those which identify with traditional rural values and distinguish enemies as 
those associated with urban elites. With globalization of media, the West, led by the United 
States, is widely (albeit wrongly) perceived as associated with urban “modernity”. 
  We have also seen that the market civilization thesis, unlike prior arguments about 
religiosity, poor education, poverty, or income dissatisfaction—offers an account for all four 
salient characteristics of the global Salafi jihad. Loyal service to groups rather than states is a 
rational and functional response to high structural unemployment, and processes of bounded   24
rationality can cause a de-individualization of members of out-groups, lowering the threshold 
at which an individual can approve of terror. The collection action problem is solved because 
decisions for violence are made by group leaders, not followers, and leaders can directly 
benefit from a fight. Variance in approval of Islamist terror over time and space is solved 
with urbanization: countries with weak markets that experience high rates of urbanization are 
more susceptible than others to inter-group and anti-state violence as new and rising urban 
groups seek to establish new balances of power. We have seen that in recent decades 
predominantly-Muslim countries have experienced higher rates of urbanization than other 
countries. Finally, with globalization of the media the West is widely perceived by insecure 
urban dwellers as another out-group with inimical interests, and in this way terrorism against 
the West is a mere continuation of local politics across borders.  
  Once we comprehend the in-group mindset we can understand the ambitions of leaders of 
the global Salifi jihad. The whole idea of a state having the monopoly on the use of force 
over a geographic space makes sense only for those who regularly engage the market, 
because only then is a state needed that enforces contracts equally, protects freedom to 
contract, and seeks to enhance the general welfare. For those dependent on groups, 
competition among groups is constant: winners repress losers, within and across nations. Like 
the Marxist and fascist mass movements in Europe a century ago—when terrorism also took 
root among the urban poor (Gurr, 2006: 87)—the global Salifi jihad movement today does 
not recognize the legitimacy of the states they happen to be in or accept the idea that states 
should possess the monopoly on violence. Nor do they approve of the Westphalian system of 
sovereign states: Similar to the Marxists and fascists, Islamists “insist that the entire Muslim 
world forms one community that should be united” (Sadowski, 2006: 227). It is this challenge 
to Westphalia that unites the nations of market civilization against them, as it is the monopoly 
on the use of force by states who agree on the basic norms of international law that serves as   25
the vital backbone of the global marketplace. While it is obvious that Islamist terrorists 
cannot possibly achieve their objective in overthrowing Westphalia, they fight anyway 
because in the clientelist mindset of collective loyalty, dying for the group is a matter of 
honor, just as it once was in Europe before the mindset changed towards individualism and 
defending the state (Bowman, 2006). 
The policy implications for combating the sources of Islamist terror are direct and 
profound. To clear Islamist terrorists from Mao’s “water” of people in which they obtain 
succor and recruits, states and international organizations must increase the economic 
opportunities available for the poor dwelling in the large cities of the Islamic world, and 
provide them the needed services, such as access to health care and education, that many 
currently obtain by pledging loyalty to militant Islamist groups. Globalization has made 
urban poverty a global security issue. 
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Table I.  Sources of Approval of Islamist Terror    
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Islamic practice  0.00 - - - - 
  0.00 - - - - 
Education  -  0.02 - - - 
  -  0.05 - - - 
Poverty  - -  -0.03 -  -0.05 
  - -  0.04 -  0.03 
Income dissatisfaction  - - -  -0.12
† - 
  - - -  0.05 - 
Urban*Poverty  - - - -  0.15
** 
  - - - -  0.04
 
Urban  - - - -  -0.17
 













































































Intercept 1  0.07 0.07
  -0.14 -0.25 -0.46 
Intercept 2  0.72 0.77 0.57 0.45 0.23 
Intercept 3  1.97 2.06 1.85 1.73 1.46 
Pseudo log-likelihood  -7032 -9181 -9100 -9129  -626 
Pseudo R-squared  0.06 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.06 
N  6,257 7,937 7,867 7,904 5,624 
Standard errors, corrected for clustering by country, in second row of each 
cell but not reported for country dummy variables and intercepts to save 
space. Empty coefficients for nations indicate question was not asked in that 
country. Ordered logistic analyses performed using Stata 10.0. 
* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
† p < 0.05 but in wrong direction; two-tailed tests. 
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Appendix: Correlations and Summary Statistics of the Independent Variables 
   Correlations Summary  Statistics 
Variable    1 2 3 4 5 N  Mean 
Std.
dev. Min. Max.
Islamic practice  (1)  1.00       6257 2.5  2.2  1  7 
Education  (2) 0.16  1.00        7937 3.9  1.8  1  7 
Income dissatisfaction  (3) 0.06 -0.14 1.00      7904 2.6  0.9  1  4 
Poverty  (4) -0.02 -0.34 0.32  1.00    7867 2.2  1.9  0  6 
Urban  (5) -0.09  0.06  -0.19 -0.05 1.00  5692 0.3  0.4  0  1 
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